HOW TO SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE AFGHANISTAN?

The above question ‘How to solve a problem like Afghanistan?’ has now attained riddle-like status amongst international observers, NATO, coalition troops, the US and any interested parties concerned about the crisis in the country. Ten years this weekend, a US led NATO force invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of the al-Qaida attack on the twin towers in New York, and the citadel of America’s Department of Defence, the Pentagon. The invasion led to the overthrow of the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan, one which accommodated the terrorist group, al-Qaida.

Thousands of dead coalition troops and tens of thousands of dead Afghan civilians later, the country remains in a state of political impasse and divisions which, if left unchecked, will inevitably result in civil war in a country which can least afford to be sucked back into the vortex of conflict. How to solve a problem like Afghanistan has led to the cooling of the symbiotic relationship between the US and its long-term ally, Pakistan. The relationship enabled the Americans to utilise Pakistani resources including personnel in its fight against the Taliban, al-Qaida and armed militants and in return, Pakistan was furnished with financial aid.

The relationship was put on ice following criticism of the Pakistan government by the US for harbouring and providing a safe haven for the Taliban and al-Qaida. The Pakistani government have also shown little by way of action to dispel or rebuff the allegation of their intelligence agency’s (the ISI) close links to the Taliban and the Haqqani network, the group of insurgents linked to recent spates of high profile attacks in Afghanistan including the 13 September siege on the US embassy in Kabul, last month’s attack on a US air base just outside of Kabul and the attack on the CIA headquarters in Afghanistan. Concerns have also arisen over what seems to be the Taliban’s increasing ability to infiltrate Afghan security network. The killings of several significant figures in the Afghanistan government are indicative of the level of success achieved so far by the Taliban, al-Qaida and insurgent groups. The deaths of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of President Karzai and an influential figure within the country’s government, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former President of Afghanistan, as well as the latest foiled attempt on the life of President Karzai by an ally perhaps underscores the reality of the new Afghanistan.

The reasons for the reversal of NATO’s gains in Afghanistan have well been documented. Several of which include the diversion of coalition resources to Iraq, NATO’s complacency in failing to ensure the retention of territory won from the Taliban, NATO’s failure to engage with civilians on the ground and Pakistan’s seemingly lackadaisical attitude towards tackling insurgents and militants operating freely from their territory, especially in the Waziristan region of the country. Analysts have especially identified the Waziristan region of the country as the base or the headquarters of the Taliban and insurgent fighters if you like. Further and importantly, the lack of a legitimate government as an alternative to the Taliban, as identified by the former NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal has also played a part in the country’s slide towards anarchy which has resulted from the porous security offered by the government to its people. President Karzai’s remark, on the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan, to the effect that Afghans have been let down by the international community’s failure to provide adequate security did not escape the attention of observers.

With civil war looming and the 2014 withdrawal date of NATO combat forces imminent, the tidal wave of anarchy and violence will need to turn soon. Pakistan surely holds the key to any sort of success which can reasonably be achieved in Afghanistan. The war of words between both countries now playing out in the media is certainly counter-productive. Both countries will need to engage without the posturing currently being displayed as both have a lot to lose in the ongoing conflict. For one, the continuing conflict does little for the reputation or development of Pakistan which is perceived as a safe haven for militants. It is surely hoped that both countries can engage in meaningful discussions to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan problem. The alternative is the reality of military conflict between both countries and observers would not have failed to note reports that the US may harbour intentions of attacking insurgents, namely the Haqqani group in Waziristan, the territory of its one time ally, Pakistan.

It is also impossible to positively foresee the current numbers of NATO-trained Afghan forces providing any sort of deterrence to militants after NATO combat troop withdrawal in 2014. Perhaps an extension of the combat troop mission past 2014 should be considered. Endemic corruption in high levels of the Afghan government has also served to reduce the credibility of the government in the eyes of its people. People on the ground have scarcely seen little of what democratic governance brings. President Karzai will need to accept this rather than resorting to his default position of blaming foreign contractors and foreigners for importing corruption into the country. A root and branch re-organisation of government will be needed to eradicate the stench of corruption which has significantly damaged the reputation of the government amongst its people as only then will the people witness and appreciate the results of sacrifice, blood and otherwise, paid by its people for freedom from the Taliban over the last decade.

Commendably, President Karzai has attempted to engage with the Taliban; however his half hearted attempts at engaging with them have proved unsuccessful. Pessimistically, one has to accept that the Taliban will always wield influence in Afghanistan; therefore, the government and the international community will have to accept that reality. New talks will have to be opened by the government of President Karzai, and this time, senior government officials will need to engage wholeheartedly in any sessions, meetings and dialogue held with the Taliban. It is unlikely that the Bonn International Conference on Afghanistan to be held in December will solve the problem that is Afghanistan. Securing peace and stability is undoubtedly a daunting prospect, but it is possible that the international community can rise to the challenge. The alternative is long-term relative decline into anarchy and decadence.